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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS M. SILVER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890138 
Priority Classification 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF AGREEMENT 
1. The Tax Commission declares in their brief, that 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92 is a clear and unambiguous statute. 
The Commission goes on to argue that the plain language of the 
statute shows it to be a "civil evasion penalty, not a fraud pen-
alty" (Respondent Brief p. 9). The Commission does not attempt 
to explain the distinction between the two characterizations or 
cite any law in support of this claim but the apparent intent is 
to avoid the application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-94 which 
places the burden of proof upon the Tax Commission to prove 
fraudulent intent to evade tax. The Tax Commission's character-
ization of the statute ignores the fundamental rules of statutory 
construction that (1) a statute should be construed as a compre-
hensive whole, (2) in accord with usually accepted meanings and 
(3) under the assumption that each term in the statute is used 
advisedly. 
2. The Tax Commission in its Statement of Facts 
makes many factual allegations but fails to comply with Rule 
24(a)(7) and 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which 
require a citation to the record to support factual allegations. 
In fact the Tax Commission's brief does not contain a single 
citation to the record to support its factual allegations or its 
statements of the evidence or its view of the proceedings below. 
Many of the factual statements not only are unsupported 
by the record but are simply untrue. These same untrue factual 
allegations are used by the Commission in support of its argu-
ments in its brief. 
3. The Tax Commission objects to Dennis Silver rais-
ing the issue of the Commission's failure to follow statutory 
procedures and the filing of tax warrants prior to a final deter-
mination of the case. This issue was not extensively argued in 
the administrative proceedings because warrants should not have 
been filed prior to a final determination and Mr. Silver was 
assured by representatives of the Tax Commission that none were 
going to be filed until there was a final decision on his 
appeals. 
4. The Tax Commission argues that they need not fol-
low the usual statutory due process procedure outlined in the 
state statutes because no "tax deficiency" was present. The Tax 
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Commission further argues that there is no state statutory proce-
dure for assessing the penalty provided for in Section 59-14A-92. 
The Commission then argues that they may look to federal law and 
refer to a federal Internal Revenue Service regulation which they 
say supports the assessment of the penalty without notice or 
opportunity to be heard. 
The Utah State statutes provide the same procedures for 
assessing penalties as for assessing tax. The Tax Commission 
just failed to follow those statutes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER CHARACTERIZED AS A CIVIL EVASION 
PENALTY OR A FRAUD PENALTY, UTAH CODE ANN. 
SECTION 59-14A-92 REQUIRES A DETERMINATION 
OF FRAUDULENT INTENT TO EVADE TAX OR OTHER 
WILLFUL, INTENTIONAL CONDUCT. 
1. The fundamental rules of statutory construction 
require that statutes be construed as a comprehensive whole. 
This Court in the case of Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 
687 P.2d 821, 831 (1984) said: 
In the first place, a fundamental principal 
of statutory construction is that a statute 
should be construed as a whole, and its terms 
should be construed to be harmonious with 
each other and the overall objective of the 
statute. 
2. A statute should be construed in accord with usu-
ally accepted meanings. 
The best evidence of the true intent and pur-
pose of the Legislature in enacting the Act 
is the plain language of the Act. The mean-
ing of a part of an act should harmonize with 
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the purpose of the whole act. Separate parts 
of an act should not be construed in isola-
tion from the rest of the act. 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Utah 679 P.2d 903, 906 
(1984) 
3. Terms used in a statute are assumed to be used 
advisedly by the legislature. 
Foundational rules require that we assume 
that each term of a statute was used advis-
edly; and that each should be given our 
interpretation and application in accord with 
their usually accepted meaning unless the 
context otherwise requires. 
Grant v. Utah State Land Board, Utah 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (1971) 
The Tax Commission isolates and then misquotes the sec-
tion of the statute which they contend gives rise to the $1,000 
penalty assessed against Dennis Silver. They characterize this 
as a "civil evasion" penalty. They totally ignore the remainder 
of the statute. 
The statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-92, when taken as 
a whole, provides and sets forth, as its title suggests, a scheme 
of Civil and Criminal penalties. The statute begins, at section 
(1) "Every person who without fraudulent intent, fails to make, 
render, sign or verify any return within the time required by or 
under the provisions of this chapter is liable to a penalty of 
$50. . . . " This is generally construed to be the "negligence" 
portion of the statute because fraudulent intent is not present. 
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Section (5) of the statute says "Any person whof with 
intent to evade tax or any requirement of this chapter or any 
lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to pay the 
tax, or to make, render, sign, or verify any return, . . . or who 
with like intent makes, renders, signs or verifies any false or 
fraudulent return or statement or supplies any false or fraudu-
lent information is liable to a civil penalty of not more than 
$1,000. . . . " This is generally viewed as the "fraud" penalty 
portion of the statute. The intent here is the fraudulent intent 
to evade tax. 
The record supports this analysis. At the beginning of 
the hearing the following discussion took place: 
Hearing Officer: As I understand it, in 
reviewing the file, this is the $1,000 fraud 
penalty; is that correct? That's the only 
issue? 
Mr. Dever: That's the only issue to my 
knowledge (Mr. Alderman nods head) . . . (R. 
144) 
Following some preliminary matters the following discussion took 
place: 
Mr. Alderman: The penalty asserted here 
apparently has been asserted under two sec-
tions of the applicable statute at the time. 
There is a negligence penalty and fraud pen-
alty that were both asserted and have been 
assessed against the petitioner, and I think 
it's inconsistent to have the negligence pen-
alty assessed and the fraud penalty assessed 
also, because they require different levels 
of determination of intent, with the negli-
gence penalty being—lacking intent of the 
fraud penalty. Of course, with intent. 
-5-
We would like to Commission to rule on 
which portion of the statute is being heard 
and what portion of the statute will be 
enforced. 
Hearing Officer: Mr. Dever, do you have any 
comments? 
Mr. Dever: Mr. Harward and Mr. Larrabee, 
it's the tradition of the Compliance Division 
that 59-14A-92 as applied during the period 
in question allows a negligence penalty and a 
fraud penalty. There is a $50 penalty for 
each year, a $1,000 penalty for each 
fraudulent. 
And it's our interpretation that either 
penalty may be imposed by the Commission. I 
believe whether or not it's the $50 or up to 
the $1,000 depends upon the facts that are 
introduced into evidence, and I believe that 
they can be pled in the alternative and that 
the Commission can find in the alternative. 
I don't believe that they are exclusive, 
and I don't think we have to move for one or 
the other or limit ourselves, because I 
believe the Commission can determine that if 
fraud was not found, at least negligence is 
shown, and they can go with the negligence. 
Hearing Officer: Any other comments? 
Mr. Alderman: No. 
Hearing Officer: As far as the Commission is 
concerned, the penalty issue is open wide, 
and they will determine from the facts which 
penalty will be imposed, and they will look 
at it. So it's basically wide open at this 
point. (R. 145-146) 
It is evident that at the time of the hearing both the 
hearing officer and counsel for the Commission and Mr. Silver 
understood the Legislative scheme and the clear meaning of the 
statute. 
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An integral part of the Legislative scheme is that when 
"intent" is in issue, the burden of proof shifts to taxing 
authority. Utah Code Ann. Section 59-14A-94. Burden of Proof, 
is a part of that overall scheme. It provides that: 
In any proceeding before the tax commission 
under this act, the burden of proof shall be 
upon the petitioner except for the following 
issues, as to which the burden of proof shall 
be upon the tax commission: 
(1) whether the petitioner has been guilty 
of fraud with intent to evade tax; . . . 
The Commission says in their brief, "In fact, no fraud 
or intent to defraud was alleged." (Respondent's Brief p.9). If 
this is so, then only the negligence portion of the statute would 
apply because that is the section of the statute which deals with 
failing to file without fraudulent intent. 
The Tax Commission cites no support or case law for 
their interpretation of the statute. Their interpretation essen-
tially renders Section 59-14A-94(l) meaningless as Section 
59-14A-92 is the only penalty provision in the Individual Income 
Tax Act which deals with the "fraudulent intent to evade tax" 
penalties. 
II. THE FACTS BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION DO NOT 
SUPPORT A CLAIM OF INTENT TO EVADE OR FRAUD-
ULENT INTENT. 
The Tax Commission claims that intent to evade a 
requirement of the act can be inferred from the "facts before the 
Commission". (Respondent's Brief p. 11). They go on to allege 
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several facts in support of their claim without citing to the 
record to support these "facts". 
Several of the alleged facts are as follows: 
1. "Silver filed returns only after a finding of con-
tempt by the district court." (Respondent's Brief p. 11). The 
fact is no finding of contempt was ever made by the district 
court. In fact the court extended an additional 30 day in order 
for Silver to complete the returns. (R. 104-117) 
2. "Silver failed to meet the filing deadlines 
imposed by the court." (Respondent's Brief p. 6). The record 
shows that when Mr. Silver found out that the court had imposed a 
30 day deadline under the Writ of Mandate, he contacted the 
Attorney General's office and requested an extension which was 
granted. (R. 224-225). 
3. "After two district court order to show cause 
hearings and a finding of contempt (which was later purged). 
Silver filed his final delinquent tax return on September 21, 
1986. These findings were finally accomplished years after they 
were due and only after numerous administrative conferences, con-
tinuances and several court hearings". (Respondent's Brief p.6). 
The fact is there was only one order to show cause 
hearing and there was never a finding of contempt. Mr. Silver 
filed all his returns, except one which had to be corrected, by 
the deadline set by the court (R. 235). Nowhere does the record 
disclose the alleged "numerous administrative conferences, 
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continuances and several court hearings". The only court hear-
ings were those discussed above. 
The Tax Commission makes no mention of other facts that 
are in the record which tend to indicate that Mr. Silver was try-
ing to comply with the Tax Commission's requests, and had no 
intent to evade a requirement of act. Mr. Silver testified that 
he did not believe he was required to file Utah income tax 
returns because his federal adjusted gross income was below the 
filing requirement and he did not owe any tax. (R. 219-220). 
After being contacted by the Commission he agreed to 
file. He hired both a bookkeeper and a CPA to assist him. (R. 
221). These actions were taken prior to the Writ of Mandate pro-
ceedings and are clearly not the actions of a person who seeks to 
evade his obligations. Mr. Meyer, the CPA hired by Mr. Silver 
also testified that Mr. Silver contacted him and retained his 
services in early 1985, prior to the Writ of Mandate proceedings. 
(R. 251-252). 
If the burden of proof to show intent is on the Tax 
Commission, as we believe it is, they have not shown an intent on 
the part of Mr. Silver to fraudulently evade a tax or other 
requirement. If, on the other hand, the burden were to be placed 
on Mr. Silver, he has shown by his acts that he did not intend to 
evade the filing requirements after being notified by the Commis-
sion that he must file. Prior to that time he believed he was 
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not required to file a state return because his adjusted gross 
income was insufficient to require him to file a federal return. 
III. THE ISSUE OF FILING WARRANTS PRIOR TO A 
FINAL DETERMINATION WAS RAISED BUT HAS NOT 
BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE TAX COMMISSION. 
In his request for a hearing dated May 12, 1987 subse-
quent to the summary denial of his request for an abatement of 
the penalty on April 24, 1987, Mr. Silver requested that the Tax 
Commission 
Rescind all penalties which were assessed in 
error and/or not in accordance with Utah Law 
and Legislature Intent as applied to this 
case 
and 
Recall all affected "warrants and Demand for 
Payment of Taxes . . . " (R. 54) 
It was not known, until after Mr. Silver's Bankruptcy 
Petition had been filed that warrants had in fact been filed. 
This is due to the fact that an assessment of penalties under 
Utah law does not become final until a final decision is rendered 
on an appeal. Any warrants filed and liens arising thereunder 
are in error and void. 
IV. DEFICIENCY PROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR UNDER UTAH 
STATUTES APPLY TO THE ASSESSMENT OF PENALTIES 
AS WELL AS TAX. 
While we agree with the analysis of the "piggyback" 
nature of the state law to federal law as stated by the Tax Com-
mission, federal law would only apply if procedures are not set 
forth in the state statutes. 
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In this case the Tax Commission claims that the state 
has no statutory procedures that address assessments of penalties 
where there is no underlying tax deficiency and so they resort to 
federal law to justify the assessment of a penalty without fol-
lowing the deficiency procedures. 
Resort to federal law is unnecessary as Utah law 
expressly provides that penalties as referred to in Title 59 may 
be treated as tax. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-705 provides: 
The penalties, interest and other liabilities 
imposed by the provisions of Title 59 shall 
be paid by the taxpayer upon notice and 
demand by the Commission and shall be 
assessed and collected in the same manner as 
taxes. Except as otherwise provided any ref-
erence in Title 59 to "tax" includes penal-
ties, interest and other liabilities." 
(emphasis added) 
Procedurally there is no difference between a liability 
arising as a result of a proposed assessment of a deficiency in 
tax or a proposed assessment of a deficiency resulting from a 
penalty. In either event the taxpayer is entitled to the same 
procedural due process. 
In any event the Tax Commission's reliance are Treas. 
Reg. § 301.6659-l(c)(1)(i) is misplaced. Under federal tax law 
this regulation applies to the late filing penalty under IRC 6651 
which is analogous to the penalties provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-14A-89. 
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These penalties are accruing penalties, like interest, 
which are added to the tax and collected as part of the tax. 
Treas. Reg. 301.6659-l(c)(2) applies to penalties aris-
ing under IRC 6653(a) and (b) which is analogous to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-14A-92; 6653(a) being the negligence portion of the 
statute and 6653(b) relating to fraud penalties. The regular 
deficiency procedures apply to penalties proposed under this part 
of the regulation. Therefore, if federal law applies, Mr. Silver 
would still be entitled to notice of the proposed deficiency (tax 
or penalty) and a hearing upon petition for a redetermination. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary issue in this case is one of statutory con-
struction. The fundamental rules of statutory construction when 
applied to Utah Code Ann. §S 59-14A-92 and 59-14A-94 demonstrate 
a legislative intent to create a system of civil penalties, with 
a $50 penalty, (negligence) for persons who fail to file or sup-
ply information without fraudulent intent to evade and a $1,000 
penalty for persons who act with fraudulent intent to evade. If 
the $1,000 penalty is in issue, then the burden of proof is upon 
the Tax Commission to show requisite intent. 
Based upon our analysis of the statute and the evidence 
in the record the decision of the Tax Commission upholding the 
proposed penalty should be overturned and any liens against Mr. 
Silver's property released. 
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The secondary issue, the failure of the Commission to 
follow statutory procedures in assessing the penalty and issuing 
warrants prior to a final determination need only be addressed if 
the court upholds the proposed penalty. In that event the court 
must decide if the Tax Commission followed statutory procedures 
in obtaining their lien. 
Based upon the Commission's failure to follow the nor-
mal statutory procedure the court should overturn the liens 
placed on Mr. Silver's property prior to the decision and assess-
ment becoming final. 
Respectfully submitted this ?3 day of November, 1990. 
<^C /^# / l ^ 
KENT 7B. ALDERMAN 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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